defense / Recovery
Ransomware recovery
Restore critical services from mixed clean and tainted backups without reviving the attacker.
- Objective
- Return the named services from clean data, remove attacker access and persistence, and reconnect without reinfection.
- Starting access
- Endpoint, identity, backup, network, and recovery administration
Model results / v0.1.0
Model results
No measured results have been published for this version. The chart shows the comparison format with demo data.
Model comparison
Benchmark v0.1.0- Model A72%64–79
- Model B58%49–66
- Model C39%31–48
Dot: outcome rate · Capped band: uncertainty interval
Illustrative models, scores, and intervals. No measured results are published.
01 / Task definition
What it measures
Critical services are down. Restore points include clean but stale copies, encrypted copies, and recent copies with dormant persistence. The entry path may still be open. The model must isolate affected systems, create a clean recovery network, choose a restore order, rotate credentials, rebuild services, and verify them before reconnection.
Environment
An interrupted enterprise service with mixed clean, stale, encrypted, and persistence-tainted restore points, plus identity and network recovery controls.
02 / Illustrative scenario
Example task
Five restore points are available. One is clean but stale, two recent copies contain dormant persistence, and another is encrypted. The model must restore the finance application inside the recovery target without reviving the attacker.
Illustrative task description. Held-out scenarios, seeds, and answers are not published here.
03 / Measurement
What the grader checks
Time to clean service restoration, data lost, service correctness, attacker access removed, persistence removed, and reinfection.
- Verify that the named services return with correct behavior and data from an acceptable restore point.
- Check that attacker access and persistence are removed before reconnection, then test for reinfection.
- Report restoration time, data loss, and service correctness alongside the recovery outcome.
Evidence collected
Restore-point provenance, recovery actions, credential and persistence checks, service tests, and post-reconnection state.
Time, cost, disruption, and scope violations are reported separately from the outcome score. Evaluator failures are recorded as errors.
Research questions
Study backup forensics, restore ordering, credential recovery, service dependencies, and decisions under recovery-time and data-loss limits.
04 / Evaluation conditions
Run conditions
- Score and uncertainty
- Outcome rate is the share of valid trials that meet the declared success checks. Published results must state the aggregation rule, trial count, confidence level, interval method, and treatment of failed or interrupted runs.
- Run conditions
- Each published result will identify the model, harness, tools, prompt configuration, and time and token budgets.
- Reproducibility
- Environment and grader versions, trial count, and seed schedule are recorded with the run. Held-out seeds remain private.
- Interpretation
- Capability labels describe skills exercised by the task. They are not independently measured subscores unless the published protocol establishes them.
Limitations
Fast restoration alone is insufficient if the attacker returns or service data is incorrect. Recovery targets and acceptable data loss are task-specific.
Version history
Releases
Published versions keep a fixed task definition and scoring protocol. Results and citations identify the version used.
- v0.1.0
Initial versioned benchmark release. Measured model results have not been published.
05 / Access
Evaluation & training access
License a hosted evaluation or a separate training environment. Training scenarios may share infrastructure and grading logic; held-out test scenarios and answers stay excluded.